This interpretation of the phrase accords with related uses of the term "substantial," and is equivalent to the "reasonable basis both in law and fact" formulation adopted by the vast majority of Courts of Appeals. The statutory phrase "substantially justified" means justified in substance, or in the main - that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. Moreover, that question is multifarious, novel, and little susceptible of useful generalization at this time, and is therefore likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion standard will permit to develop. As a matter of sound judicial administration, the district courts are in a better position than the courts of appeals to decide the substantial justification question. Requires a fees award "unless the court finds that" (rather than simply "unless") the United States' position was substantially justified, and by the statute's structure, which expressly provides an abuse-of-discretion standard for review of agency fee determinations. However, deferential, abuse-of-discretion review is suggested by the EAJA's language, which Neither a clear statutory prescription nor a historical tradition requires this choice of standards. In reviewing the District Court's determination that the Secretary's position was not "substantially justified," the Court of Appeals correctly applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, rather than a de novo standard of review. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in concluding that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified, and that the special factors relied on by the District Court justified exceeding the $75 cap.ฤก. The court awarded fees to respondents under the EAJA, concluding that the decision not to implement the operating subsidy program had not been "substantially justified," and basing the amount of the award, which exceeded $1 million, on "special factors" justifying hourly rates in excess of the $75 cap. fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee." "be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that. While the District Court was administering the settlement, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which authorizes an award of reasonable attorney's fees against the Government "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified." Under the EAJA, the amount of fees awarded must After two of the decisions were affirmed by Courts of Appeals, a newly appointed Secretary settled with most of the plaintiffs, including respondents. Various plaintiffs, including respondent members of a nationwide class of Government-subsidized housing tenants, successfully challenged the decision in lawsuits in nine Federal District Courts. One of petitioner's predecessors as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development decided not to implement an "operating subsidy" program authorized by federal statute, which was intended to provide payments to owners of Government-subsidized apartment buildings to offset rising utility expenses and property taxes.
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